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CHAPTER I 
IN'!RODUCTION TO 'lJIE PROBLEM 
Conformity as defined by Webster is •the state and or quality' of 
l 
being in agreement, harmo~, etc.; congruity". Theories of socialization 
point out that man begins his attanpt at harmonizing himself with his 
environment at a ver,y ear~ age, and it is also true that unless a 
person solid~ achieves this harmoqy by adulthood he will probab!f be 
referred to a psychiatrist. The proverbial "men from Mars" might be 
more impressed by this "quality of being in agreement• than by ~ 
other phenomenon or quality possessed by their earthling neighbors. 
Even the most pronounced deviate conforms in far more ways than he 
deviates, and the striking fact is that ·he deviates at all. Perhaps it 
is this all-pervasivenss of confomit;y that makes it seem so simple and 
yet be so difficult to comprehend. There are feil psychological phenomena 
which have been explained in so ~ different ways by so ~ different 
authors. There are feil areas in psychology in which there is so little 
conformity' of ideas among the theoreticians and researchers who have 
attempted to study it. 
Franklin Giddings, the founder of "pluralistic behavior" 1 once 
made the statement that •it we could sufficient~ reduce the prevailing 
temperature, we would find practical~ ever,yone going about with his 
1 Webster•a collegiate dictianar,y, Springfield, Mass: G. and c. Merriam 
co., 1938 
(l) 
1 
coat collar turned up about his ears", It is perhaps just as true that 
a norm of coat collars being turned up could be established without aey 
temperature reduction, Many groups adopt norms regarding matters of 
dress without the excuse of any stimulus as logicalq connected as 
changes in temperature. Teen-age gangs in New York City calling 
themselves the "Shirt Tails" make themselves conspicuous by wearing 
2 
their shirts outside their trousers; men wishing to .be identified as 
•texans" own and wear "cowboY" boots, whether or not they've ever been 
near a horse, and ten-gallon hats, even though they spend most of their 
time in-doors; Ivy-League fraternity men would rather perish from the 
cold than ever be seen without their gray-flannel suits, striped ties 
and "white bucks•. 
Nor is the evidence supporting conformity onq descriptive and 
anecdotal, We also have the experimental evidence, such as Sherif's 
"Study of Some Social Factors in Perception.~ Sherif found that 
individuals reacting to an unstructured stimulus formed a cOIIIlllOn basis 
for responding, Here the norm was actualq generated in the laboratoey, 
It is, thus, an empirical fact that one of the b,y-products of 
group formation and structure is the establislunent of standards of conduct, 
mores, folkways, social norms or whatever other name one wishes to choose. 
The hard fact is that there are striking similarities in the behaviors 
of group members. 
1 Allport, F.H,, The J-curve of conforming behavior; In G.E. Swanson, 
T.M. Newcomb, and E.L. Hartley (Eds,), Readings in Social Psychology, 
New York: Holt, 1952. P 55 · 
2 Sherif, M., and Sherif, c.w., An outline of social psychology, New York: 
Harper, 1956. P 243 
3 Sherif, M.,A study of some social factors in perception, Arch. Psychology 
1935, 187 
(2) 
Many social theoreticians agree with Erich Fromm that for a 
societ,y to function well, there must be a conformity of behavior, or 
as Franm puts it, a societ,y, in order to continue, must make its 
l 
members all "want to act in the way they have to act". Societies 
do not flourish in chaos. Certain rules must be established. Sherif 
has cited maw historical examples of group norms in formation, sane 
of the most interesting of these concerning the western United States 
during the days of the gold rush. 
At an individual level, confomit;r behavior provides one with 
stable anchorages upon which to organize and structure perceptions. 
It allows one to !mow what to expect in most social situations, and it 
prevents the distressing anxiety whiCh follows the loss of stable 
anchorages. 1hus1 conformity behavior allows one to know in advance 
approxilllate:cy- what others will do, and enables the structuring of 
experience around certain stable anchorages. Students would certainq 
react with anxiety if on commencement day, their college president did 
cart-wheels and hand-stands instead of delivering the customary speech, 
a speech which exhorts the students not to be conformers. Whether this 
(.3) 
is subsumed under role Sheory or not, the point remains that psychologicalq 
individuals need conformit,y from others, and further, that society must 
have the conformity of its members in order to flourish. 
1 Fromm, E., Individual and social origins of neurosis, American Soc., 
Rev., 1944, 91 P .380 
(4) 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL APPR<».CHES 
The fact that individuals respond in striking4' similar fashions, 
that there is conformity of behavior, is not doubted. Great differences 
1 
occur, however, in the interpretation of this phenomenon. To Tarde, 
conformity and even all social behavior was explainable in terms of 
illlitation, but of i.llitation itself Tarde was less explicit. Says Allport, 
Tarde likens this illlitative process "to a hypnotic dream state ••••• to 
somnambulism, which runs its course under the dominance of photographic 
images formed qy the model in people's minds•~ 
Imitation actual4r has been used qy many theorists other than 
Tarde in an attempt to explain this overwhelming fact of social conformity. 
Some, like Baldwin~ saw imitation as the explanation of not on4' conformity 
behavior, but the key to the hUIUll ability of gaining knowledge. Mead4 
used i.llitation as the spring-board which took him on to a role theory. 
Both J8148s5 and McDougall6 Thought of imitation as an instinct but 
1 Tarde, G., The laws of imitation, Transl., New York: Henry Holt 1903 
2 Allport, G.W. The historical background of modem social psychology, 
In G. Lindzey (Ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley, 1954, P 22 
3 Baldwin, J .M., Mental development in the child and in the race, New York: 
Macmillan, 1895 
4 Mead, G.H., Mind, self and society, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934 
S James, w., Principles of psychology, New York: Holt, 1890 
6 McDougall, w., Introduction to social psychology, London: l1ethuen, 
1908 
(5) 
McDougall .felt that it lacked the goal-directedness o.f the true instinct. 
Some o.f the current learning theorists, Miller and Dollard, 1 have 
also taken over imitation in an effort to explain con.fol'lllity behavior. 
Imitation, here, however, is not so much an inference, but is instead 
given the status o.f a dependent variable. That is, illlitation rather than 
•explaining" con.forlllit;r, real:cy defines it, so that conformity is synonomous 
with imitation. Con.formit:y or illlitation is analyzed within S-R reinforcement 
theory as .follows: 
I.f a person is interacting with a person of higher skill, 
(1) the subordinate .finds himself gaining rewards by doing 
what the other does, 
(2) the subordinate learns to respond to the other's acts and 
not to the cues to which the other is responding, 
(3) sufficient repetitions and reinforcements o.f this behavior 
can lead to a learned drive to ,illli.ta·te. 
This type o.f imitation, Miller and Dollard call "matched dependent 
behavior," and it presents con.fol'lllity as a totalJ,y irrational form o.f 
behavior, .for the individual does not respond to the characteristics of 
the problem situation but soleJ,y in terms of the behavior of the other 
group members. 
Miller and Dollard also speak of "copying", a more complex 
imitative process. Here the follower is not originalJ,y able to make the 
l Miller, N.E., and Dollard, J., Social learning and imitation, New Haven: 
Yale Univ. Press, 1941 
(6) 
same response as the leader, but through trial and error learns to do so. 
Further, in this case, the reinforcement does not necessari4r have to come 
from another person, but may stem fran the subject himself. The response 
~be more directly concerned with the problem situation. 
Suggestion has also been used extensively by theoreticians in 
an attempt to explain conformity. Even Tarde's feeling that ilaitation 
was a hypnotic, sonambulistic state has undertones of a kind of suggestion 
1 
being at the root of confoX'lllity. Following Liebault•s introduction of 
the term, writers such as Charcot and especiall,y LeBon used the concept 
extensively in their theories of behavior. LeBon• s2 "The Crowd", which 
Allpor~ calls a direct product of Charcot's teaching, speaks of the 
behavior of crowds as resulting from the suggestion that groups exercise 
on their members. Individuals are seen as mere passive recipients of 
this suggestion, and their behavior follows completely irrational lines. 
Among the current theorists, Sherif~ who feels that stimuli are 
structured in terms of •external social influences", and Festinger? who 
1 Liebault, A.A., Du sommeli at des etats analogues, consideres surtout 
au point de vue de 1' action de la morale sur le physique, Paris: V. 
Masson, 1866 
2 Le Bon, G., The crowd, London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1920 
3 Allport, G.W., The historical background of modern social psychology, 
In G. Lindzey (Ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Cambridge, Mass. 1 
Addison-Wesley, 1954, P 26 
4 Sherif, M., and Sherif,DW., An outline of social psychology, New York: 
Harper, 1956 
5 Festinger, L., Informal social communication, ~sychol. Rev., 1950 
57' Pp 271-282 
(7) 
speaks of social "pressures toward wtifomity" show the influence of 
LeBon's writinga. 
The psychoana4'tic explanation of conformity, proposed by Freud 
and extended by men like Redl and Scheidlinger, also owes much to 
Charcot, LeBon and the "suggestion" explainers. What had been labelled 
suggestion, the Freudians feel is a result of identification. Group 
members accept the suggestion of their leader because they identifY with 
him, ace~:;t his values as theirs, .feel a libidinal attachment to him and 
to each other. 
Still another theor,y of conformit,r is the reference group theor.y 
which seems to recognize on4' conformity, for what may appear to be deviation 
in a given social setting is merely the adherence to norms of a different 
group which the individual is referring himself; that to which he aspires 
need not be the group to which the individual actual4' belongs. The 
"explanatory" nature of this theory does not lend itself readily to 
predictive experimentation because of its completely ad-hoc character. 
Another theory of confomity has come out of the writings of 
l 
David Riesman, who, in the "1ond4' Crowd" accepts tbe , fact that 
confomit,r is a wtiversal tendency. Riesman takes a more sociological 
approach, and explains how societies differ in their methods of ensurillg 
behavioral conformity. Citing both historical and demographic factors, 
Riesman .first points to the break-through from the Middle Ages, that is 
the Renaissance and the Reformation, and also to the concommitant 
demographic change from high birth and high death rates to high birth and 
low deaths. Secondlr, he depicts the recent shift from an all•out 
1 Riesmann, D., The lonely crowd, New York: Doubleday, 1955 
emphasis on production to an increasing e~~];ii!Gb on consumption, and its 
de~~ographic change to low births and low deaths1 or as he calls it, 
•incipient population decline•. Each phase in the eYolutionary process 
(8) 
finds societies ensuing contol'llicy in distinct w&7•• Bri!D.r to the Renaisw 
sance1 with the high birth aild death rates, Riesman portrays a young societu1 
generation following generation in rapid ord.er1 a very stalU:e and ritual-
istic sooiecy with little change. During this period the sociecy cti.Telops 
in its cypicalmeabers a coll1'o1'1111tu e1111ureci tw their tendency to follow 
traditions, each me~~ber behaving as his father did before him. 
Next, as the Midclle Ages come to a close, and the newer methods 
of sanctation begin to halt the high death rate, the ties of tradition, 
(Church and Royalcy)1 are slow:Qr severed as the increased population can 
no longer spend their lives on the same olci plot of lallli. People begin 
to awe, to conquer new lands in order to take care of the tremendous 
grCIII'th spurt. Olcl custc.a are no longer useful with the multitude of 
novel situst1o1111 to be met, and societu lays down geDeral principles or 
ideals to live by-1 rather than the specific behaviors that were set forth 
by the traditionwdirected sociecy. 
These principles are internalized by the youth and guide them 
through lite, giving rise to a new contormicy called •Inner-4)1rection'l 
.lnd final:cy-1 especial:cy- in the United States, Riesman finds still 
another change, trom production to consumption, fran high birtiul to a 
lower birth rate, tram inner-direction to other direction. !_s the material 
environment is slow:Qr conquered, other people become the main probl81111 and 
the youth internal1ses1 instead of ideal norms, a dependence on other 
people to guide him. 1bat this final change is not complete can be seen 
by Riesman•s statement that •other--direction" is to be found more in the 
larger cities among the upper-middle class, and that iliiler-direction is 
still predominant in the rural areas. 
Fr0111 none of the preceding can it be assumed that other-direction 
is to be deplored because of its greater enf=eaent of confol'lllity, 
although some readers have felt tha.ttbis was Rissman's implication. It 
could be that the other-directed individuals are less rigidzy confol'llling 
and more tolerant of deviation than the inner-directed people, whose 
(9) 
very inner-direction stems from a common tradition. It is entirezy possible 
that there is more conformity in small rural towns than among the upper-
middle class in the larger cities. Or to go back in history to a time 
when inner-direction was paramount, how much tolerance of deviation was 
to be found among the earzy Puritan settlers? It very well could be that 
one of these modes of ensuring conformity is more efficient, but it may 
be inner rather than other-direction that provides for the least deviation. 
CHAPTER III 
'lHE PROBLEM 
our original definition of conformity, or our literacy defin-
ition taken fro.'ll Webster, was simpl;r used as a lead-in, for it would 
be very difficult as it stands, to work with in a~ precise way. Our 
task is to set up an operational definition, one whose meaning will 
not be easiq subject to lllisinterpretation. As a first approximation 
of this operational definition, we will define conformity generalq as 
the agreement between an individual's behavior and the nol'lll8 or standards 
for that behavior in his membership group. This mq be operational onq 
in so far as we can specify the norms, a problem we will deal with a 
little later on. 
As seen from this definition, it proposes no functional relation-
ship, nor must an operational definition necessariq do this. As 
Underwood1 has stated, and as Bergman and Spence2 have agreed, an 
operational definition ·~ onq reflect a demonstration that a reliable 
phenonenon exists". The task here is to identif.y the phenomenon and make 
reliable measurements of it. 
1 Underwood, B .J ., Psychological research, New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1957, P 52 
2 Bergmann, G., and ::>pence, K.W., Operationism and theory in psychology, 
Psychol. Rev., 1941, 48, Pp 1-14 
(10) 
The scientific procedure followed here will be that which 
1 Underwood has labelled IIResponse Identification", that is, our subjects 
will be exposed to a static set of conditions, and we will attempt to 
show that their :responses differ reliabq. We will further try to reduce 
these response dimensions to as unitary level as possible, for we agree 
with Underwood that one of the purposes of scientific anaqsis is to 
isolate unique phenomena. In each case, our break-down will be defined 
operationally and we will try to demonstrate the reliability of the 
measurements. 
Finalq, we will attempt to relate our response measures to 
other variables, for no matter how reliable a response measure may be, 
it's use is limited until it relates to something else. 
Before proceeding further, it nw becomes necessary to clarity 
the three major points which are of great importance to an:y definition 
of conformity, I181lleq individual behavior, nonns and the group. 
1. Individual Behavior 
(11) 
The main problem here ia to distinguish between conformity resulting 
from an individual's objective, overt behavior and that resulting !ram 
his perception of his own behavior, tbe two not necessariq always 
being in agreement. It is possible for an individual to perceive his 
behavior as conforming, when to an objective observer he would be 
labelled a deviate, and converse:cy-, although a person may perceive himself 
l Underwood, B.J ., Psychological research, New York: Appleton-Century 
Crofts, 1957 
as a non-conformist, the observer mB¥ find him conforming. 
II. Norms 
The term norm offers much ambiguity in all fields of psychology, 
and this becomes even more apparent in the social psychology of con-
formity behavior. Each group has so many norms that it is difficult to 
assess conformity and non-conformity without spelling out the n.rious 
l 
norms as precise:cy- as possible. As was pointed out by Brodbeck and Nogee, 
the word norm, in the first place, is •sometimes used to designate .what 
2 
people use as an ideal," of how they judge the 11rightness or wrongness 
of their social practices"; whereas at other times it has the statistical 
meaning of 'lrhat most people judge to be the most COlllllon behavior of the 
other people. 
The first use of the term denotes the workings of the super-ego 
or conscience, suppcsed:cy- internalized at an ear:cy- age and called by 
Riesman "the gyroscope". In the second case, the statistical usage, 
the term denotes a judgment of the actual mc6al behavior in a given group. 
Relating this to the previous notions of subjective individual conformity, 
we find that a person ~ perceive himself to be acting in accord with 
e~er his judgment of the ideal norm, or his judgment of the modal 
behavioral nom, or possib:cy- a comqination of the 
norms, it has been noted (Brodbeck et al~ may act 
two. Both of these 
as sanctions to reinforce 
(12) 
1 Brodbeck, A.J., Nogee, P., and DiMascio, A., Two kinds of conformity1 a 
study of the Rieaman typology applied to standards of parental discipline, 
The Journal of Psychol., 1956, 4l Pp23-45 
2 Ibid 
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
certain habits of social interactions, but they also may cause conflict. 
Behaving in terms of an ideal norm may cause an individual to become an 
anxiety-ridden deviate in his membership group, whereas acting in terms 
of one's perceptions of the model behavior, especialzy when it conflicts 
with the ideal, may generate feelings of guilt. 
One of the leading psychologists in the field of social norms, 
Muzafer Sheri?,defines a norm solezy in the ideal sense. Says Sherif 
(-p 241) "social norms incorporate value judgments pertaining to a range 
(13) 
of items. They impzy evaluations of modes of behavior relative to persons, 
objects or situations. Specifi~alzy, norms refer to expected or even 
ideal behavior in utters of some importance to the group." 
Farther, says Sherif, •The average behavior of members in a group 
may or may not coincide with that denoted by its norms at any given 
period in its history. In fact, certain norms may set such a high level 
for desirable conduct that average behavior of members could approach it 
2 
oozy at exceptional times". 
Sherif, though making the distinction here between ideal and 
statistical modes of behaving, fails to admit the statistical usage 
to his definition of a social norm. By doing this, he finds it possible 
that in certain situations the behavior exhibited by all the members in 
a group may be classified as deviant behavior. He can visualize an entire 
group of deviates, despite the fact that all the members of the group may 
be acting in a similar fashion. The observer would be placed in the 
1 Sherif, M, and Sherif, c.w., An outline of social psychology, 
New York: Harper, 1956 
2 
Ibid 
unfortunate position of describing a group where all but one member may 
be deviates, even though all the members, except that lone "confomer• 
are acting the same ~. 
Despite Sherif's theoretical position, his concept of social 
norm undergoes a remarkable metarmorphosis when he takes it into the 
laboratory. In his now classic experiment on the stuey of social factors 
in perception, Sherif utilizing the autokinetic effect, found that 
establishment of a social norm was peculiar to the given interaction 
situation. Sherif measured the estimates of how tar subjects perceived 
the light to move, the social norm being considered as the convergence 
of these estimates toward a coDIIIIOn distance. "hat is ideal about how far 
a light moves? In his own experiment, it is impossible to find •the 
average behavior of members in a group (not coinciding} with that denoted 
by its norms". 
Sherif also cites other experiments, most of which are similar 
to his own in that the,y have the subjects make estimates of something 
and the cCIIIIIlOn estimate is considered the norm. l'here is nothing 
l 
(14} 
approaching an ideal norm in eit,her Bovard's experiment on the estilllation 
of the length of a green rectangle nor Asch 1 ~ stuey on the judgments of 
which lines are of equal length. 
1 Bovard, E.W., Group structure and perception, Journal of Abn. and Soc. 
Psychol., 1951, 46, pP398-405 
2 Asch, S.E., Effects of group pressure upon the modification and 
distortion of judgments; In Group Dynamics, Cartwright and Zander (Ede.} 
New York: Row, Peterson, 1953 
To avoild dil.ellmas of this nature, it becomes necessary to 
analyze the general concept of a norm into some of its caaponent parts, 
(15) 
and from this to distinguish various types of conformity and non-confol'lllity. 
Obvious:~¥ the statistical nom is no probl.em, as all one need do is count 
responses until the most popular behavior is determined. But we also can 
ask an individualllhat he perceives to be the ideal behavior in his group, 
and we can count up these responses and arrive at an ideal percept. 
In other words, we can distinguish a statistical-ideal norm. Similarq, 
we can ask an individual how he perceives the average person in his group 
as behaving, and from this isolate a most popul.er perception of average 
behavior. Final:cy, by asking an individual how he perceives himself as 
acting, we are in a position to count the most frequent "own-perception• 
and establish another norm. 
It 11181" be that we IIIey" find no agreement Blllong individuals on 
these perceptions, that there are no 1110st-popul.er perceptions. Or 
we find agreeaeat only in self-percepts, or only in ideal-percepts. 
Or perhaps we will find that noms are peculiar to only certain sit-
uations, or certain types of situations, as for example situations revolving 
around intarection with a famiq member, or perhaps a person of higher 
status. On these matters we will have to wait and let the data talk. 
ill. 'lbe Group 
Probabq the thorniest problem arises when one attempts to speci.i)' 
the group to which an individual is conforming. Reference group theorists 
have pushed the concept so that if an individual is found not conforming 
to the norms of a particular contemporary group, it still can be argued 
that he may be conforming to the standards of some other group. '!his 
allows the argument that if a college fraternity man is not conforming 
to the standards of his present group, he may be conforming to the norms 
of his high-school group, or church group, etc. The ad-hoc nature of 
such an explanation makes its testability indeed difficult. We will, 
thus, confine ourselves to the problem of an individual in a specific, 
contemporary, face-to-face group, and will try to specify whether he is 
conforming or not conforming to its standards in terms of the relationship 
between his own behavior and the mo.dal behavior in the group. 
The reference group concept could be utilized in this discussion 
if one were to ass\llle that the membership group and the family group 
are the two major groups which an individual can refer and compare 
his behavior. lhat is, that a person who is not using his membership 
group as a reference group is probab:QI; in most cases, using his !ami]¥. 
That this could be the case seems to be borne out in Newcomb's Bennington 
study! Those students who did not shift their attitudes toward the liberal 
group norm were characterized by Newcomb as being over]¥ dependent on 
their parents, or, as continuing the use of their fami]¥ as a reference 
group. FUrther, when an individual is behaving in accord with his 
membership group, that is, when the membership group and the reference 
group are the same, the individual is behaving in a manner which Riesman 
1 Newcomb, T.M., Attitude development as a function of reference groupsa 
the Bennington study. In G.E. Swanson, T .M. Newcomb, and E.L. HarUey 
(Eds.), Readings in Social Psychology, New York: Holt, 195'2 
(16) 
would call, • other-directed". When, however, individuals seem to ignore 
the norms of their membership group and act instead, as did Newcomb's 
Bennington comservatives, in terms of the norms of the family, Riesman 
would characterize these individuals as inner-directed --- the norms of 
their reference group having been internalized. Each indivi.dual, thus, 
hes the major choice of using as his reference group, the contemporary 
membership group with which he is having day-to-day interaction, or the 
powerful fami:cy group, within which he has been nurtured and socialized. 
What are sane of the reasons for an individual to maintain a 
family reference group in the face of contradictory norms aminating from 
his membership group? In the first place, both the studies of Sherif and 
Bovard indicate that this is not a rare case, that after participating 
in the formation of a social norm the individual usua.J.4r takes this norm 
as his own standard, even after he 1 s left this original interaction 
situation. A further reason for the continuation of the use of familial 
norms is that perhaps the indivi.dual is not accurate:cy perceiving the 
norms of his new membership group. l'bat this may have been the case at 
Bennington can be inferred from Newcomb• s statement that; 0 Informal 
(17) 
investigation had shown that whereas most students were aware of the marked 
freshman-to-senior trend aw~ from conservatism, a few particular:cy among 
l 
the conservatives had little or no awareness of it.• 
The ability to perceive correctly the membership-group norm is 
extreme:cy important when confomity to that norm is considered. An 
individual may always be a deviate from the behavioral norm if he is 
unable to recognize what this nom is. From the experimental data 
l Newc011b, T .11. Attitude development as a function of reference groups: 
the Bennington stuey. In G.E. swanson, T.I-1. Newcomb, and E.L. Hartley 
(Eds.), Readings in Social Psychology, New York: Holt, l9S2 
in this field, we find that it is not a COllllllon case to find an indiv-
idual who is aware of the group norm not conforming to it. When norms 
are made explicit to the subject, where he cannot misperceive, con-
formity to these noms is the usual outcome. This is true whether the 
norms collllllunicated to the subjects are actually reflections of his co-
worker• s behavior or simp4' fictitous norms fed to him by the experimenter. 
Experiments where conformity has occurred under conditions where the correct 
l 
(18) 
or actual norms are communicated to the subject include: Bovard's experiment 
2 
on the estimation of the lenght of a green rectangle, Sherif's autokinetic 
experiment, and Mausner 1 ~ study on the judgment of the length of lines. 
Incorrect or "fake" norms are communicated to the subject by Asch~ and 
others. 
It is certain4'" true that conformity is not one hundred percent 
in these studies. There are cases, especial4'" in the Asch experiment, 
where a person acts idios,yncratica14', or acts in opposition to his 
perception of the norm. The important point, however, is that it matters 
not whether or not the norm is actually a reflection of the group, on~ 
whether the subject perceives it as such. 
1 Bovard, E.W., Group structure and perception, Journal of Abn.and Soc. 
Psychol., 1951, 46, Pp398-405 
2 Sherif, M., A study of some social factors in perception, Arch. Psychol 
1935, 187 
3 Mausner, B., The effects of prior reinforcement on the interaction 
of observer pairs, J. Abnormal and Social Psychol.,l954,49, 65-68 
4 Asch, S.E. Effects of group pressure upon the modification and dis-
tortion of judgments, In Group D,ynamios, Cartwright and Zander (Eds) 
New York: Row, Peterson, 1953 
The problem of studying conformity is a highl,y complex matter, 
and, of the maqr possible alternatives, we have selected out eight 
types of conformities for anal,ysis and measurement. In each of these 
we will work at the level of perception, because, as stated above, a 
persan•s acting in accord with a norm depends not on whether the norm 
actuall,y reflects the behavior of the group, but on how the person 
perceives it. The following, then, are the eight types to be considered, 
the exact operational definitions still awaiting a description of the 
measuring instrument: 
l. Self-Average Conformity 
The first type of conformity to be studied is that which exists 
between a person's perceptions of his own actions and his perceptions 
of how the average member of his group is acting. J. person who always 
perceives himself as acting in accord with his perceptions of the 
actions of "others" is the person whom perhaps Riesman would label as 
"other-directed." 
II. Self-Ideal Conformity 
Here we have the conformity based on the relationship between 
a person's perceptions of his own actions and his perceptions of the 
ideal action that could be taken. 'l'his is done to tcy and clarify 
the distinction between the "ideal" and the "average" concepts of the 
social nom. The person who consistentl,y perceives himself as acting 
in accord with his condept of the ideal norm is probabl,y the person wh<m 
Riesmanwould call "inner-directed"• 
(19) 
III. Average-Ideal Conformity 
In this type of conformity, or perhaps lack of conformity, we 
study the relationship between the person's perception of the average 
behavior of his group and his perception of the ideal behavior. Are 
these percepts differentiated by persons, or are the,y differentiated 
onJ,y in theory? 
IV. IdiosyncraticiSIIl 
This fourth type really involves lack of conformity, in that it 
reflects the lack of relationship between a person's perception of 
his own behavior and his perception of the average and ideal behavior. 
The person who perceives the norm in one way, and still acts in another 
wq, we call the idiosyncratic person. 
1he next four types of conformity differ from those just dis-
cuased in that they depend not onJ,y on pure~ subjective factors, but 
on an interaction of subjective and objective factors. 
V. Predictiveness 
This we call predictiveness or •social sensitivity", for it is 
here that we study the relationship between a person's perception of 
the average behavior in his group and the most popular (objectively 
determined) percept of the entire group's "own• behavior. That is, 
we can objectively arrive at a modal perception of "own" behavior for 
the membership group by simp~ counting the number of times people select 
a certain behavior a.,s their own. The most popular of these selections, 
(20) 
indeed ti their is a most popular selection, can be compared to a single 
individual's perception of the average group member's behavior, and we 
thus get a measure of the person's awareness of the group's perceptual 
norm, or the person's "Social sensitivityft, 
VI. Self-Modal Self Conformity 
In this case we stuQy the correspondence of the person's percep-
tion of his own behavior with the most popular group perception of 
"own" behavior. Here we are an~zing the conformity existing between 
how a person thinks he is acting and how most of the group members think 
they are acting, lhis is a more objective measure of conformity in that 
it does not depend on the person's own notions as to whether or not he is 
conforming. 
VII. Average-Modal Average Conformity 
This seventh type of conformity, again not depending on the 
person's own ideas as to whether he is conforming, involves the 
relationship between the person's perception of the average behavior 
with the group's most popular perception of average behavior. 
VIII. Ideal-Modal Ideal Conformity 
Final..cy" in this last case, we stuQy the agreement between the 
person's perception of the ideal behavior with the group's most popular 
perception of the ideal, In this case, we are attemptin8 to work with 
the previous:~¥ mentioned concept of the statistical-ideal nom, 
(21) 
CHAPTER IV 
'mE MEASURING INSTRUMENT AND PROCEDURE 
'lbe sample chosen for this study was selected at Brown Univer-
sity in Providence, Rhode Island. The fifty-six subjects, all members 
of the Sigma Nu Fraternity, included seventeen sophomores, twenty-
three juniors and sixteen seniors. The study was done during the 
ear~ spring, making it impossible to use freshmen, since they do not 
join fraternities at Brown until later in the year. The Social Sit-
uations Test was administered to each subject, along with a socio-
metric questionaire and a personal data fora. 
The social situations test was composed of forty items, each 
item being a brief description of a situation in which any of the subjects 
could presumab~ find himself. lne situations dealt with problems of 
inter-personal relationships in four broad social areas that is, ten 
situations were concerned with pressures revolving around interaction 
with a high status figure, ten with a law status figure, ten with a 
peer and ten with some member of the flllll~. :l'he items from the four 
areas were random:~¥ distributed throughout the test, and of course were 
not labelled. 
Each item in the test was followed by five behavioral alternatives, 
and the subject was given the following instructions: 
This test contains brief descriptions of forty social situations 
in which aJVone msy find himself. Each situation is followed by five ways 
(22} 
in which it is possible to react to that situation. If none of the 
alternatives accurateq portrays how you yourself would act, select 
the alternative most like how you would act. You are first to decide 
how you would react to the situation. Mark this answer on the separate 
answer sheet under the column headed by •selfll. 'lhen go back and con-
sider how the average college ~ would have reacted and mark this 
response under the column headed "Average•. Finslq, decide what the 
best or ideal reaction to the situation would have been and mark this 
choice under the column headed "Ideal". Whether you choose the same or 
different reactions for the three categories is entirely up to you. 
'!here are no correct or incorrect responses or combinations of responses. 
Be sure you understand these directions before attempting to mark aqy 
answers. Mark onq one choice in each column for each situation. 
R8111E!111ber, if the responses which you would like to make are not given, 
mark the one which most nearly expresses your opinion.• 
It is readily seen from these instructions that the subject was 
neigher forced, nor was any hint given to mark differentq his "lelfll, 
"Average", or "Ideal" choices. we wish to ascertain whether, indeed, 
it was possible for the subjects to make this discrimination and react 
differentially. 
'lhe following are eXll!llples of situations from each of the four 
social areas: 
I. High Status 
Your major professor has asked you to write a term paper covering your 
course work. The night before it is due, you are talked into playing 
cards with some other members of your fraternity. As a result you fail 
to get your paper in on time. 
{23) . 
a. Explain to your prof. that you were playing cards at the house. 
b. Tell your prof. that you were ill and couldn't get the work done. 
c. Tell the prof. that you did the assignment, but that one of the 
brothers tore it up because he was angry with you. 
d. Copy an old term paper that was hanging around the house am pass 
it in. 
e. Just go to class and say nothing about it. 
II. Low Status 
A freshman whom you consider a real "wise guy" comes into your fraternity 
dining hall uninvited. tie sits at the same table as you and starts 
helping himself to food. After piling enough food on his plate for a~ 
three people, he says that if your fraternity is lucl<;y they might be 
able to pledge him. 
a. Punch him in the nose. 
b. Ignore hilll. 
c. Push him out the door. 
d. Escort him polite:cy out the door. 
e. Explain to him politely that his behavior is quite rude, and that if 
he keeps it up he will never be asked to join the house. 
III. Peer 
You are engaged in a game of chess. One of your fraternity brothers 
canes over and stands behind you. He begins making suggestion as to 
how you shotili Pl.a¥ the game. 
a. Don't be irritated at the suggestions, but carry them out on:cy if 
they agree with your own ideas. 
b. Become quite irritated and make it clear that you're ignoring him. 
c. Tell him that you 1d like to play the game your way. 
d. •'lake the moves that this fellow suggests to you. 
e. Get up and offer your chair to him, telling him that if he wants 
to play to go ahead. 
IV. Family 
You and your 14 year-old brother are home alone one day, your parents 
having gone out for the day with some neighbors. A while later, you 
find that both your kid brother and the fami:cy car have disappeared. 
'Ihirty minutes later he retums and tells you that he's been in a 
slight accident and has dented the fender. He asks you to take the 
blame because he knows that he is too young to drive. 
a. Fight it out with him then and there. 
b. Expcse him to your parents when they return. 
c. Take the blame and convince your father that it was an unavoidable 
accident. 
d. Take the blame but make your brother pay for the repairs. 
e. Do not expose your brother, but do not aid him either. 
(24) 
After completing the social situations test, personal data was 
gathered concerning each subject, such as his name, his class, his 
grade-point average, and whether or not he lived in the fraternity 
house. Then the sociometric questionaire was administered on which 
each subject was asked to specify, in order of preference, the three 
fraternity members with whom he would most like to room, the three 
with whom he would most like to double date, and the three to whom he 
would most likely turn for advice on personal problems, and, finally, the 
three to whom he would most likely turn for advice on scholastic prob-
{25) 
lems. Because we did not think it wise to make too great a time imposition 
on our subjects, and also because of our later statistical handling of 
the data, we did not allow the subjects unlimited choice. We specified 
three choices since this is what is conventional when choices are either 
l 
limited or required. Also, since each sociometric choice should be 
made with a particular activity in mind~ we selected four activities, 
room'"IIB.te, double-date, advice on personal matters and advice on scholastic 
problems, because these were common to the group and meaningful to all 
the members. 
OUr sociometric data, however, is only in terms of acceptance 
and not rejection. We originally planned to collect rejections, but 
found that the members of the fraternity were extremely hostile to this 
l Lindzey, G., and Borgatta, E.F., Sociometric Measurement. In Handbook 
of Social Psychology, G. Lindzey {ed.), Cambridge, Mass.; Addison-
Wesley, 1954, P 408 
2 Ibid p 407 
idea. It is probabl,y less anxiety provoking to specify the people you 
accept than those you reject, yet other investigators have ~tainad 
rejection data without mention of aqy problems involved. Perhaps a 
college Fraternity is a unique group in this respect, because of its 
:ldeal norm of comraderie and brotherhood. Perhaps the very idea of 
aeyone daring to ask for rejections was an insult to the fraternity 
system, and the hostility shown on the part of the members may have 
been caused by feelings of guilt for their own inability to introject 
this ideal norm of brotherhood. Xhis is more than just speculation, 
for despite the overt act of calling each other brothers, and the pledges 
of uneying loyalty taken during ceremonies, the writer did hear Dilley 
uncomplimentary remarks levelled at other members during the gathering 
ot the sociometric date, •••••••••remarks such as "I'll bet---------------
wom 1 t get aqy votes". 
Despite their ability to verbalize feelings such as these, the 
hard fact remains that the members of this fraternity were vehement in 
their refusal to put their dislikes down on paper, and seemed affronted 
because they were asked to do so. 
After the data was collected from our fifty-six subjects, we 
were able to construct eight scales, each a measure of some aspect of 
conformity. Since we will later demonstrate the reliability of our 
scales, we will now say that performance on this test measures conformity. 
It may be true that our test does not measure all the characteristics of 
behavior that have at one time or another been labelled "conformity" by 
social ps.ychologists, but as it stands our operational definition is sound. 
The following is a list of the scales and how they were constructed: 
(26) 
&. Subjective Scales 
1. SA. Scale 
The SA. score respresents the number of times a subject's self 
choice on the test agrees with his average choice. Each time the 
alternative the subject chooses for himself agrees with that chosen for 
the •average" fraternit,r man, the subject receives one point. We define 
Self-Average conformity (described in Chapter III) as that which this 
scale measures. 
II. SI Scale 
Tbe SI score measures Self-!deal conformity and is constructed 
b,y counting the number of times the subject's choice for a •self" 
alternative agrees with his choice for an •ideal" alternative, 
III. AI Scale 
This score, the measure of Average-Ideal conformity, is based 
on the number of times the individual's "average" choice coincides with 
his •Ideal" choice. Xhe results of this scale tell us whether people 
do differentiate between perceptions of average and ideal behavior in 
our situations. 
IV. ID Scale 
Here we are measuring idiosyncraticism, represented b,y counting 
the number of times that a given subject's self choice is independent of 
both his average and his ideal choices. We are attemptil:lg with this 
scale to isolate the person who acts idiosyncratically, being influenced 
b,y nej,tJ!er his perception of llhat others do, nor his perception of the 
ideal behavior, 
(27) 
It must be remembered that these scales are not cCIIIpleteq 
independent, The SA, AI and SI scales all have in common those iteiiiS 
in which the subject has selected one alternative as his response for 
all three choices, average, self and ideal. The ID scale and AI scale 
have in common all items where the subject bas selected one alternative 
for his average and ideal choice and a different one for his self choice, 
Also, the ID scale is in a w~ the reciprocal of the SA and SI scales, 
in that having a high SA or SI score necessitates having a low ID score, 
for if a subject's self choice agrees a great maqy times with either his 
average or ideal choices, be cannot possibly have a high ID score which 
represents the number of times his self choice is independent of both 
his average and ideal choices. Furthermore, the sum of choices for 
each subject must equal a constant, forty, or the total number of iteiiiS 
in the test. 
1he following table represents the means, sigmas and reliabilities 
of the four scales discussed so fara 
TABLE I 
SCAlE MEAN SIGMA RELIABILITY 
SA 17.92 6.75 .82 
SI 18.05 6,05 .77 
AI 12.64 S.96 .79 
ID 13.59 6.05 .79 
The reliabilities reported in this table were computed by the 
(28) 
Cyril Hoyt formula, and are quite high. It should be said that all internal 
consistenc.y reliability formulae, like Hoyt's give lower bound estimates 
of a test's reliability, which means that these four scales are very 
reliable measuring instruments, especially in view of the fact that we 
had only forty items. 
B. Semi-objective scales 
v. P Scale 
~is is the scale that measures the afformentioned predictiveness 
or social sensitivity. Since we know from the self choice how each 
subject perceived himself as acting in each situation, it was possible 
to detennine for each item the most popular mode of responding on 
that item. The P scale was constructed by finding out how often a 
subject's average choice agreed with the group's mode for self choice. 
When a subject s~s that the average college man would do such and such, 
is this really what most of the college men say they would do? The P 
scale, thus, tests the accurac.y of each subject's prediction as to what 
(29) 
the average man would do, and it testa it against what most of the subjects 
preferred for their own self choice. 
VI. SS Scale 
In this, our measure of self-modal self confoi'Illidly, or real con-
formity, we assess the extent; to which a subject's judgment of what he 
would do agrees with what most of the group says it would do. It tells 
us how much the subject's self choice conforms to the group's composite 
pi0t1111.e of self choice. Again we reiterate, that this measure is on a 
more objective level of analysis in that it does not depend only on the 
person's own notions as to whether or not he is conforming. 
VII. AA Scale 
This scale indicated the agreement between each subject's average 
choice and the group's most popular average choice. This gives us a 
measure of what we have previousl7 called average-modal average con-
formity, and again does not depend on the subject's own perception of 
his conformity. 
VIII. II Scale 
tis scale, based on the person's ideal choice being in agreement 
or non-agreement with the group's most popular ideal choice, measures 
ideal~odal ideal conformity. 
'lhe means, sigmas, and reliabilities of these four scales follows: 
TABLE 2 
SCA.IE MFAN SIGMA. RELIABILITY 
p 13.44 3.97 so 
ss 18.33 3.72 .33 
AA 17.30 4.10 .46 
II 23.28 5.03 .67 
(30) 
These reliabilities are not as high as those on the previous 
scales, and although the reason is psrtly to be found in the inherent 
problem of lower bound estimates of reliability resulting from internal 
consistency formulae, the main difference is found in the variation among 
most popular responses. ~ince we compared each subject's response in these 
scales with the group's modal choice, error is introduced because some 
cf the group's choices are more popular than others. In some situations 
the group was in much more agreement as to a most popular alternative 
than in others. 
These latter four scales are also not complete~ independent. 
'Ihe P and SS scales each use the same most-popular self alternative with 
which to c0111pare responses (the P scale comparing with the individual's 
average choice, and the SS with his self choice), and the ~ and AA scales 
each utilize the individual's average choice. It is true, however, that 
there is more independence among these latter four scales than among 
the first four. 1'he SS, AA, and II scales are constructed independent~ 
of each other, and the II scale is independent of the P scale as well. 
In the construction of these scales the most difficult problem 
consisted in the selection of the most popular alternative with which 
to compare each subject's response. As will be shown in Chapter VI, 
(31) 
there were significant differences in amounts of consensus for the average, 
ideal and self choices. There was most consensus when the ideal choice 
was concerned, that is on more of the items the subjects selected the 
same alternative as the "ideal" w~ of reacting, than when th~ had to 
choose the way th~ would respond or how the average member would respond. 
The next most consensus occurred on the self choice, and the least 
agreement resulted when the subjects had to select the alternative they 
thought the •average person" would follow. Thus, the most popular 
alternative when the ideal choice is considered is more popular, on 
the whole, than when the self or average choice is considered. 
In order to ascertain the most popular response on these three 
choices, we could have set an arbitrary number like 28, which is SO% 
of the total vote on each item, and called an alternative "most Popular" 
onl;r if it had at least 28 people selecting it. The difficulty with 
this procedure, however, is that sane items would have to be excluded, 
since none of the alternatives were selected b.1 the necessary SO% of 
'the subjects. Also, we would have had to exclude more items from the 
average and self choice lists than from the high-consensus ideal list. 
Thus, to keep the scales equal in number of items, we decided to call 
(32) 
an alternative most popular when it had the most persons selecting it, 
even, as in the case of a few items, when it surpassed another alternative 
by onl;r one. We felt that we needed to keep the scales constant as to 
number of items in order to compare a subject's responses on the various 
scales, to see, for instance, whether a subject was higher on the SS 
scale or on the II scale. There would be no basis for comparison if 
the scales were different in terms of what the top score -eould be. 
CHAPTER V 
SOCIOME'l.RIC PROCEDURE 
As stated earlier, we asked our sUbjects to identifY the three 
persons, in order of preference, that they would most like to room 
with, most like to double-date with, most like~ turn to for advice of 
a personal nature, and most like~ turn to for scholastic advice. We 
were in~erested here simp~ in a measure of inter-personal choice and 
its relationship to other variables. We were not concerned with 
measuring s001e general disposition or under~ing trait, and accepting 
this limitation, there was no need for factor ana~sis. We o~ 
wanted to know who was choosing whom, and the specific content of 
our ~~~UBstions had no deep significance. We are willing to accept 
a face validity. 
Since, it is conventional to specify three choices when choices 
are limited, we had to decide whether or not to weight these choices. 
Zeleny ~s done considerable work in this area, incorporating ranked 
choices into his indices. However, Foa2is displeased with the little 
work that has been done at a theoretical level as to what it means to 
give different scores to first, second and third choices. Say 
1 Zeleey, L.D. Selection of compatible f~ partners, Allier. Journal 
of Sociol., 1947, 52, 424-431 
2 Foa, U.G., Scale and intensity ana~sis in sociometric research, 
Sociometry, 1950, 13, Pp 358-362 
(33) 
1 
Lindzey and Borgatta 11 The researcher should be cautious in weighting 
choices, especial~ if the choices are required11 •••• as they are in our 
study. And they further say, 11Since weighting is ordinari~ arbitrary, 
there is no evidence that equal weights (ignoring choice order) would 
not be as good as assigning weights by any other arbitrary technique"• 
We, therefore, decided not to weight, and we score first, second and 
third choices equal~. 
Since we were interested in obtaining one over-all sociometric 
score, we had to examine the choice status of our subjects in terms of 
the four criterea at the same time, and it was necessary that we develop 
some unit of standardization. We, thus, separated in terms of total 
vote the choices each individual received on all four criteria. We 
simply gave each individual a score based on the total nUlllber of votes 
2 
received on all four criteria. Since there is evidence (Bonney 1949) 
(34) 
to show that length of time in college is related to number of sociometric 
choices, we first broke our group down into the three classes, sophomores, 
juniors and seniors. As expected, the seniors had more votes than the 
juniors, and the juniors more than the sophomores. However, when this 
finding was put to statistical test, a different result was obtained. 
The Kruskal~allis test gave us an H corrected for ties, of only 3.1325. 
1 Lindzey, G., and Borgatta, E.F., Sociometric Ueasurement. In Handbook 
of Social ~sychology, G. Lindzey (Ed.), Cambridge, Mass. 
Addison-Wesley, 1954 P 414 
2 Bonney, M.E., A study of friendship choices in college in relation to 
church affiliation, in-church preferences, family size, and length of 
enrollment in college, Journal of Soc. Psychol., 1949, 29, Ppl53~6 
Since this is the same as a Chi Sq with 2 degrees of freedom, we failed 
to get a significant difference, 5.99 being needed at the .OS level. 
Because of the great number of tie scores, we wondered about the validit.y 
of this use of the Kruskal-Wallis test. We then applied the median test 
(35) 
to the same data, and obtained a Chi Sq of 3. 764, also short of signilicance 
at the .05 level. The reason for using these non-parametric techniques 
was that the distribution for choices was not normal. The conclusion 
must be that number of sociometric choices is not related to length of 
time in the fraternit.y. 
We then differentiated the sociometric votes in terms of the four 
criteria, and obtained four distributions. Each of these distributions 
was cut as near the median as possible, allowing us to ascertain which 
subjects were high and which low on these four criteria. Subjects from 
all three classes were placed together during this procedure, since we 
had previously found that class made no difference. With this unit of 
standardization for criteria, we then proceeded to construct a scale 
which would allow us to give each subject a score on each of the four 
criteria measures. If the subjec.t was above the median on "room-mate" 
he was given a plus: if he were below the median he received a minus, 
and so on for the other criteria. This technique made it possible to 
give each of our 56 subjects four scores, each one ei~er a plus or a 
minus, and it gave us a total of 224 scores with which towork. Thus, 
a subject could have a total sociometric score of either 0, 1, 2, 3, 
or 4, depending on how ~ times he was above the medicn on each of the 
four criteria. These measures were then analyzed for reliability via 
the Cyril Hoyt method, and it was found that we had a fair:~¥ good 
measuring instrument, with a reliability of .69. We, thus, have a 
relative:~¥ reliable measurement of inter-personal choice, and we are 
in a position to relate this to other variables. 
(36) 
GROUP NORm AND ANALYSIS 
In analyzing the data from the social situations test, it was 
possible to obtain some indication of possible group nonns by analy-
zing the distribution of the nuaber of choices per alternative for 
each of the forty items. For instance, on item #1, six of the 56 
subjects indicated alternative three, five subjects indicated alterna-
tive four, and twenty-four subjects indicated alternative five. There 
was, thus 1 on this item for the self choice, some degree of consensus, 
some indication of a group nonn, alternatives two and five being the 
most popular. If there were absolutely no consensus, we would have 
obtained a flat distribution, with approximately eleven subjects choosing 
each alternative (56/5 ; 11.2}. We wished to compare the items in tenus 
of whether it was the self, average or ideal choice that received 
the most consensus. Also, we wished to see if there were any differen-
tial effects as far as consensus is concerned when we compare the items 
from the four social areas. 
We first took the distributions of each item for each choice, 
and we compared each one to a non-consensus or flat distribution by taking 
the amount of deviation from 11. for each alternative. In item one, 
as shown above 1 the self choice distribution was 61 21, 01 5, and 241 
and the deviations from eleven were 5, 101 111 61 and 13. The deviations 
for each item were then squared, and the sum of these squares we considered 
(37) 
our measure of consensus for the item. Like the distribution for Chi Sq, 
however, this distribution was not nonaal, so we actual~ normalized it 
via the square-root transformation. This distribution tended to be quite 
normal and we were able to utilize these scores in an analysis of variance. 
We were able tc compute a measure of consensus for the self, average and 
ideal choice on each of the forty items, giving us a total of 120 measures. 
It can be seen from this that the lower the score, the less the consensus, 
since the flat distribution would not deviate from eleven at all, and the 
sum of squares would be zero. 
The highest amount of consensus would result when one alternative 
was selected by all 56 subjects. 'L'he most consensus achieved on our 
test was for the ideal choice on item #14. The distribution here was 
1, 6, 1, 0, and 48. The sum of squares of the deviations from eleven 
was 1715. The leasb consensus on our test was found for the self choice 
on item #5, with the sum of squares being o~ 26.91. The distribution 
was 13, 14, 12, 9 and B. 
We then proceeded tc do an ana~sis of variance on these data, the 
two classifications being the social area of the item (Hi status, Lo 
status, peer and fami~), and the type of choice (self, average and ideal). 
The computations were set up as follows: 
HI 
Status 
Lo 
Status 
Peer 
Self 
37 
25 
39 etc. 
TABLE 3 
CHOICE SCA.LE 
Average Ideal 
(38) 
:tb.e scores entered were, it must be remembered, group scores. 
:tb.us, an item with a score of x under self' and along the Hi Status 
row means that the group had x amount o:r consensus regarding that 
item under the two conditions Self and High Status. World.ng across 
the table it is evident that we are getting repeated measures of the 
SBIIIe item under the three choice conditions, self', average and ideal. 
These measures then are correlated. Going down the table, however, 
the items are different, allowing us to consider the social areas, 
Hi Status, Lo status, Peer and Fami.ly as independent. We thus, used 
two estimates of error, the pooled items for our independent estimate 
and our pooled scale times items for the correlated estimate. 
:tb.e results are given in the following table: (Alpha at .o5) 
F: Scale x Social Area 
Scale x Item 
TABLE 4 
IN'J;ERACTION 
: ZB•05 or.li!Not significant, 2.22 is 
,3.39 needed at .05 for 6 and 72 D.F. 
Social Area trends over Choice scales are parallel. There is no 
interaction. 
SCAlES 
F : Between Scales 
Scale x Item = 
Significant 3.13 is needed 
at .05 for 2 and 72 D.F. 
Item JDeasures under differing scales differ significantly • regardless 
of Social Area. 
(39) 
SOCIAL ARFA 
F : Between Areas 
Items 
-
- 2.91 Significant 2.87 is needed 
at .o5 for 3 and 36 D.F. 
We first notice that the interaction was not significant, that 
the choice scales and social areas were not working together to produce 
differential effects. However, since the social area F was significant 
we reject the hypothesis of equal means regardless of social area, 
assuming instead that amount of consensus differs according to which 
social area is involved. So too with the choice scales, for since 
the choice F is significant we reject the ~othesis of equal column 
means, the means instead differing significant~ depending on whether 
the choice is self, average or ideal. The amount of consensus obtained 
in a given situation, therefore, is not effected b,y a joint effect of 
choice and social area, yet it is effected b,y both the choice and the 
social area teken separate~. 
Note -- Test for Haaogeneity of variance (Bartlett) gave a Chi Sq of 
8.28. Since 19.675 is needed at .05 for ll D.F. we conclude samples 
were drawn from a population with a common variance. 
Now since these differences are sta tiaticall.y significant, we 
are now able to show that there is the most consensus in our group 
when the ideal choice is concerned, that is, our subjects were most in 
agreement when it came to picking out the ideal thing to do in such 
and such a situation. The next most consensus was with the self choice 
and the least occurred when we asked what the average college man 
would do. In like manner, we find that the most consensus is achieved 
(40) 
when the situation concerns the fami~ area, next most with those sit-
uations revolving around interaction with a hi status figure, next 
with peers and the lowest with lo status situations. Our subjects, 
thus, were most in accord when the situation concerned some member of 
their own !ami~. 
Since the F test allowed us to reject the general Null eypothesis 
coneerning scales and social area, we wished to find out where these 
differences occurred. We, thus, computed t. tests, using the correlated 
t on scales and the independent t on social areas. 'i'he following table 
gives the results of the correlated t.'z 
TABLE 5 
Self vs. Average 
t: 3.16 
Self vs. Ideal 
t = 5.90 
Ideal vs. Average 
t = 6.66 
2.021 t.Q5 for 39 d.f. 
------------------------------~--------------J~· We thus, reject the Null eypothesis in all three cases, and accept 
the J:vpothesis that consensus varies significant~ according to the type 
of scale. 
The social areas it will be recalled are independent, and our t 
test must take that into account. Using Guilford's formula for making 
(41) 
independent t tests following F tests, we found that acy difference between 
means of 5.51 or greater is significant at the .05 level. On4' the 
difference between fami4' (24.1) and low status (18.6) is significant at 
this lenl. Thus, although the t tests fail to show as sharp differences 
among social areas as they did among scales, we may certain4' take note of 
the trend. 
As said earlier, some of our situations elicited a good deal of 
consensus in our group. For instance, on item fourteen, a situation 
dealing with the family, forty-eight of our fifty-six subjects checked 
the same alternative when asked for the ideal way to respond. How does 
one account for such agreement, since it is fairly certain that such a 
_ situation could never have turned up in a bull session that the entire 
house had attended? It is even improbable that the exact situation had 
ever been discussed by acy of the members prior to the giving of the 
test, yet the group responded almost as one when the test was administered. 
(42) 
CHAPmR VII 
INDIVIDUAL Dl11 
Looking again at the SA, H and SI scales, we wish to answer 
two questions. First, do a person's scores on these scales depend 
on what class the person is in, and do the l1181llbers of this fraternity 
score higher on one scale than on another? To do this we again set up 
an ana~sis of variance, the two variables being class and scale. 
Since there were both three classes and three scales, we utilized a 
3 by 3 design. We !mow logically that the SA., AI and SI scales are 
not c0111plete~ independent, (we gave these reasons earlier, and we will 
also show later that they do indeed correlate via the Pearson r. ) so 
we again had a problem where one variable is correlated (scales) and 
the other variable is independent (class). 
The design was as follows 1 
TABLE 6 
SI .u 
Subjects 
So ph. Scores are 
Jr. inserted 
sr. here 
(43) 
(44) 
'!he results are given in the following table: 
TABLE 7 
Interaction hypothesis: 
F: Class x Scale (corr) : 4.99 Significan~F .o5 (4) (106)= 2.46 
Sub x Scale 
Class cypothesis 
F : Class (Ind.) = 
Sub 
-Scale hypothesis 
F Scale ( corr) = 
= Sub x scale 
-•99 Not significant, ,3,18 is needed at 
.o5 for (2) (5.3) d,f. 
16,801 Significant, F.05 (2:)(106) • ,3.09 
Bartlett's test for homogeneity showed homogeneous variances, 
as the Chi Sq with 8 degrees of freedom was only 8.0,361 15.1507 being 
needed at .05 for significance. 
'lhe results show that there is a significant interaction between 
the two variables class and scale, '!he class trends over scales are 
not parallel, the two variables working together to produce differential 
results, A visual inspection of these results is possible from the 
following graph: 
(45) 
TABLE 8 
20. 19 04 
19. 17.62 
lB. 
17. l 1!4 
16. 16' 2 
15'. 
l3. 
l2. 
ll. " 
~ 
" lO. lOi$3 
Soph. Jr. Sr. 
~----------------
SI;_ ___________ _ 
AI o o o o o o o o o o o o o 
The Null ~thesis concerning class is accepted, as the F is less 
than one. Scores on the three scales do not differ significantl7 
depending on class, no one class having more inner or other direction than 
another class. 
As for scales, we reject the Null hypothesis and accept instead 
the alternative hypothesis that scores do differ significantly according 
to the scale. To discover exac~ where these differences lie it was 
necessary to CCllllpute three t tests. ::iince these scales are correlated,, 
we c0111puted our t via the difference foriiiUla, having our degrees of 
freedOIIl but considerably reduc;lng our estimate of the standard error · 
of the difference. Again setting alpha at .05, the results of the t 
follow: 
TABLE 9 
l. SI vs. AI 
5.41 
• B. 72 Significant t .05 2.005 at 55 d f t•- = 
.62 
2. Sl Ts. AI 
t = 5.28 
• 8.80 S;Lgnificant 
• 60 
3. SA. Ts. SI 
t = 
.13 
• 1.00 Not significant 
.(6 
lbe SI mean of 18.05 is, thus, significant:cy greater than the AI 
mean of 12.64, showing that our subjects perceived themselves as agree-
ing more to the ideal noZ'Ill than they perceived the ideal agreeing with 
the average. They, thus, discriminated between the average and the ideal, 
it not being chance that the SI mean was greater than the AI. If the 
subjects had not been able to differentiate the ideal response from the 
average response, the scores on the AI scale would have been equal to or 
higher than on either of the other two. However, since our subjects could 
perceive themselves as agreeing more to the ideal than they perceived a 
(46) 
congruence between average and ideal, we can safe~ say that they had two 
distinct referents for their ideal and average choices. In like manner 
the mean for the S& scale was significant~ higher than was the mean for 
the AI scale, showing that our subjects perceived themselves more as 
agreeing with the ideal. The difference between the S& and SI scales, 
however, was on~ a chance difference, allowing us to assume that there 
were as maey subjects who perceived themselves as agreeing with the ideal 
as there were those who agreed with the average. In Riesman's terms, then, 
our group shows as much inner as other -direction. 
Now, if the AI scale had had the highest mean, it would have meant 
that our subjects had scored most of their agreements between average 
and ideal, forcing us to assume either that in the particular situations 
which we presented, the group saw the average college man as most always 
doing the ideal thing or that our group couldn't differentiate the 
average from the ideal. As it turned out, the AI scale had the lowest 
mean, an average of 5.41 fewer agreements per man, showing that our 
subjects could both differentiate the average from the ideal, and yet 
in certain cases could also see the average college man as acting in 
the ideal unner. 
The question could arise as to what referent was used U,y our sub-
jects when they examined the situations in terms of ideal and average 
choices. If a person is high on the SI scale, it is an easy matter to 
argue post hoc that this is due to the fact that the individual is really' 
other directed but is comparing himself to the standards of some group 
other than the college population. We attempted to collect, some 
(47) 
phenomenological evidence on this point by interviewing a number of our 
subjects after they had taken the test. 
E- -what crossed your mind, or, of what were you thinking when you decided 
how the average college man would react to a certain situation? What 
were you using as a basis for your opinion?"· 
1- •I thought of what the majority would do.• 
E- "The majoritu in this fraternity?• 
1- 11Yes.• 
2- ttwhat most of the guys would do.• 
E- 11Most of the guys in the fraternity?" 
2- "Yes, and most of the guys at Brown•. 
(48) 
3- " I thought of how most of the fellows here in the house would have acted". 
4- •I suppose it was in tems of numbers". 
E- "What do you mean?11 
4- "I 1118&n most act in the average way.• 
E- "Most fellows here at Brown?" 
4- 11Yea,.I guess so.• 
5- "The most, the majoritY"• 
E- 11 'lbe majority of what11 ? 
5- "'lhe majority of college students." 
6- 11I was thinking of someone who was an average sort of guy". 
E- "Are most guys here average"? 
6- "Well, s0111e are smarter than others, but, you lmow, they still act like 
pretty average kinds of guys•. 
Then we asked these same subjects about their ideal choice, what basis 
they used for selecting the ideal alternative. 
l- •I used III,Y own person ideal of perfection.•, 
2- "What I should do 1 what I was taught to do.• 
E- "By parents?" 
2- "Yes, and by church and b,y school•. 
3- "By a process of rational thought.• 
4- •By what I feel is best." 
5- •The thing you know is right to do1 what you should do." 
6- "I was thinking of someone who is moral.• 
E- "How do you know when sar~eone is 1110ral?" 
6- • By how he acta ••••• if he does what you know is honest and right.• 
Tne anecdotal evidence seems to show that our subjects were not 
using some other group as a referent for their ideal choice, but were 
instead calling upon their own internalized standards. Also our sub-
jects, in making their average choice, were using the referent of 
numerical superiority, and it seems as though their own fraternity and 
college was at the basis of this judpent1 although this latter was onl;r 
gained after sane prodding, Obviousl;r a more systematic appraisal of 
this point could have been gained by the administration of a prepared 
questionaire, given to all 56 of our subjects. Unfortunate:!¥ this was 
not thought of at the time. 
Our data, however, does answer most of the questions in and of 
itself. Our situations were constructed in such a way that the indivi-
dual could choose directl;r between the alternative solutions to the 
situation, and these choices were in terms of self, average and ideal. 
(49) 
Unless the subject was deliberate~ trying to mislead, it is hard to 
conceive of him thinld.ng in terms of the average when he is asked to 
check the ideal, and similarly it would be strange indeed if he were 
using an ideal referent in checking off the average mode of response. 
We feel that we. have vali~ tapped the perceptions of our group by 
the use of the Social Situations Test. 
As sai.d earlier we also constructed other scales from this s11111e 
data, name~ the ID scale, the SS scale, and the AA scale, the II scale 
and the P scale. The means, sigmas and reliabilities of these scales 
were reported earlier. The following table presents the correlation 
coefficients of all scales with each other. These correlations were 
computed via the Pearson product-moment method, and those with stars 
after them are significant at the .05' level, that is, there are only 
five chances in a hundred that these starred coefficients are due to 
chance. With 5'6 subjects, aqy coefficient of .26 or greater is signi-
ficant at the .a.) level, and aqy two scales which correlate at least as 
high as .26 will not be regarded as independent. 
The following table, found on the next page, will in<licate the 
various correlations: 
(5'0) 
:milLE lO 
Sl SI AI m p s ss AA II 
Sl 
SI .272* 
AI .589* .5~ 
m -.742* -.731* -.454* 
p 
.627* .084 .502* -.345* 
s -.028 .143 .025 -.099 .035 
ss -.028 .295* .093 -.193 -.209 -.229 
AA .108 .004 .099 -.123 .409* .026 -.165 
II .354* .2~ .265* -.407* .469* -.115 .394* .310* 
a a -.12 -.034 -.097 .014 -.159 .212 .217 .185 -.215 
'l.'he initials on the chart stand for the following scales1 
Sl- Self Average, SI- Self Ideal, AI- Average Ideal, m- Idiosyncratic, 
P- Predictive, S- Sociometric, SS- Self Self, AA- Average Average, 
II- Ideal Ideal, and G.P.A.- Grade-point-average. 
(51) 
a a 
CHAPTER VIII 
I.FADERSHIP 
NewcODib and Chowdry1 defined fraternity leadership in tel'llls of the 
five or six individuals in each fraternity who received the highest 
number of sociometric votes. This may not, however, be a wise assumption, 
for in our group elected leadership is not significantl,y related to 
soci0111etric status. A median test, set up in the following wa:y, 
ELECTED LEADERS 
NCN -I&DERS 
.• J 
TABLE 11 
ABOVE MEDIAN BEIDW MEDIAN 
was applied to our sociometric data, and the resulting Chi Sq of 2.01 
failed to reach significance at the .05 level. Elected leaders do not 
receive significantl,y more sociometric votes than non-leaders. It 
is true that Newcomb and Chowdry's four soci0111etric criteria were more 
aimed, on the face of it, at leadership qualities than were ours, yet 
it still remains to be shown that the sU: individuals which those 
authors selected as the high sociometries would have indeed been elected 
to office by the fraternity members themselves. Perhaps this may explain 
1 Chowdry, K., and Newcomb, T.M., "nle relative abilities of leaders and 
non-leaders to estimate opinions of their own groups, Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Ps,ychol., 1952, 47, P.P 51-57 
(52) 
1 
the Hites and Campbell stuey, a stuey which produced results in opposition 
to those of Newcomb and Chowdry. Hites and Campbell, using a method 
similar to Newoaab 1s found no differences between leaders and non-leaders 
in ability to estimate group opinion, and this was obtained regardless of 
whether the opinions concerned topics of relevance or non-relevance to 
the group. Say the authors, almost apologeticall¥1 "It is possible that 
the fraternity groups are too homogeneous to allow for very great dissension 
of opinion and that they interact so continuously that nearq everyone knows 
the opinions held by other members of the group.n2 This quote indicates 
that Hites and Campbell are not overq willing to accept their own results, 
and still wish to believe that leaders are more accurate in less homogeneous 
groups; groups, perhaps, such as Newcaab 1s. 
Our data, however, lends support to the statistical results of Hites 
and Campbell. Perhaps we also have an extremely homogeneous group, or 
perhaps leaders are not better than other members in predicting group 
opinion. We selected out our eight elected leaders and compared their P 
scores with those of the rest of the fraternity. The t test of significance 
failed to reveal any differences between the leaders• P scores and those 
of the rest of the group. In fact, the mean P score for the leaders was 
1.57 less than the mean for non-leaders; t, however, was less than one. 
We conclude, therfore, that elected leaders are no better than non-leaders 
in predicting what members of a group would do in a given situation. And 
1 Hites, R.W., and Campbell, D.T., A test of the ability of fraternity 
leaders to estimate group opinion, Journal of Soc. Psych., 19SO, 32, 
9S-loo 
2 
Ibid 
(54) 
since Hites and Campbell also used elected leaders, and not high sociometries, 
it is probable that leaders are no better than non-leaders in estimating 
group opinion on topics of high relevance. 
Our main interest, however, was in probing the relationship between 
leadership and conformity. There are two conflicting points of view on 
this issue, and that is {1) that leaders conform to group standards and 
1 
this is one reasonwqy they are elected, and (2) that leaders, their 
position in the group securs, may deviate !rom the accepted norms with 
2 impunity. We compared the elected leaders 1 SS scores with those of the 
rest of the group, for we wished to discover whether the leader's self 
choice conformed more or less to the popular self choice than did the 
self choices of non-leaders. We chose the SS scale here, because we 
felt it was our best measure of objective conformity, and it is not 
based on the individual's perception of conformity. Our results show 
that there is no difference, that leaders conform neither more nor less 
than their fellow members. 1ne mean score for leaders differed qy 1.17 
from the mean score for non-leaders, this difference being not significant 
as it was again less than one. This is an area for further research, as 
our results are far from being conclusive, the reliability of our SS scale 
being only .33. 
1 Sherif • M. • and Sherif 1 C. W. 1 An outline of social psychology 1 New York: 
Harper, 1956, P 217 
2 Sherif, M., A preliminary stu~ of inter-group relations, In J .H. Rohrer 
and M, Sherif (Eds.), Social Psychology at the Crossroads, New York: 
Harper, 1951, Pp 388-424 
'!here is one factor that is accepted almost universal:cy by investi• 
gators in the area of leadership, and that is that the leader is the one 
who exercises the most influence in the group. (o.s.s. Assessment Staff 
l 2 3 
1948; Seeman and Morris 1950; Pigors 1935). This concept of leader-
influence illlmediate:cy poses a problem if one considers the role of a 
leader in an other-directed group. If the leader and the members are 
other-directed, "the process of social influence is harrowing to contem-
plate• 4(Brodbeck, Nogee, DiMascio), for no action can ever be initiated 
if everyone is wdlting for cues from others. 
Our date shows no difference between Self-Average conformity and 
Self-Ideal Confomity, the mean SA score not differing significant:cy 
from the mean SI score, or perhaps, amount of inner-direction not diff-
ering from amount of other-direction. Although this is true of the group 
as a whole, it turns cut not to be true when we look on:cy at the scores 
of the elected leaders. Of the eight leaders, on:cy one scored higher on 
the SA scale than on the SI; the mean Sl score being 14.25, whereas the 
mean SI score is 22.12. Because of the lack of independence between the 
SA and SI scales, we used the correlated t test for comparing the two 
distributions. 
l 
o.s.s. Staff, Assessment of men, New York; Rinehart, 1948 
2 Seeman, M., and Morris, R.T., A status factor approach to leadership, 
Colwnbus; Ohio State Univ., Research Foundation, 1950 
3 Pigors, P., Leadership or dolllination, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1935 
4 Brodbeck, A.J., Nogee, P., and DiMascio, A.,Two kinds of conformity: a 
study of the Riesman typology applied to standards of parental discipline, 
'lhe Journal of Psychol., 1956, 41, Pp23-45 
(55) 
!bus, with eight subjects, we had 7 d.f'. and a value of': 
t: 7.87 a 3.68 
2.14 
t i05 = 2.365 
TABLE 12 
Reject 
We reject the Null hypothesis and accept the alternative that 
leaders indeed score ~er on the SI scale than do non-leaders. 
We are now more able to look at the process of' influence in a 
group, since it u;r be inferred that perhaps we dm•t have the chaotic 
condition of' ever,rone in the group waiting f'or cues from another, that 
perhaps the leaders are not so other-directed and are more able to 
respond to their "gyroscopes", and perhaps, even, that this is one 
reason why they are the elected leaders. The leaders, then, rather 
than being the socialq sensitive, other-directed types as portrayed. 
by Newcomb and Chowdry, may be reacting more on the basis of' what they 
thEillllelves feel is the best mode of' responding. Remember, it was the 
SA and not the SI scale which correlated with the P scale. 
(56) 
CHAPTER IX 
DISCUSSION OF PART I, GROUP RESULTS 
David Riesman has said that there are three universal modes by 
which societies ensure some degree of conformity; tradition-direction, 
inner-direction and other direction, and further that in esch socie~ 
the particular mode of conformity is built into the members of that 
socie~ at a very esrly" age. 
Slcys Riesman, "The inner-directed person has earq incorporated 
a psychic gyroscope which is set going by his parents and can receive 
signals later on from authorities who resemble his parents. He goes 
through life less independent than he seems • obeying this internal 
piloting. Getting off course, whether in response to inner impulses 
or to the fluctuating voices of contemporaries may lead to the feeling 
1 
of guilt." 
How similar this is to Freud's conception of the child introject-
ing parental norms and being guided by the guilt-directing super-egol 
It is probable, too, that Riesman would agree that in Freud's Viennese 
society inner-direction was the dominant mode of ensuring conformity. 
Present cosmopolitan United States, however, is thought by Rissman to 
illustrate other-direction as the dominant mode. Says Rissman, "It 
would be premature, however, to say that it is alreaqy the dominant 
mode in America as a whole. But since the other-directed types are to 
1 Riesman, D., The lonely" crowd, <iew York1 Doubleday, 1955, P 41 
(57) 
be found among the young, in larger cities, and among the upper-income 
gpoups, we may asslliiiEI that, unless present trends are reversed, the 
l hegemo~ of other-direction lies not far off". 
Says Riesman of the other directed type, •The other-directed per-
son learns to respond to signals fr111 a far wider circle than is con-
stituted by his parents. The other-directed person must be able to 
receive signals from far and near; the sources are maey, the changes 
rapid. What can be internalized, then, is not a code of behavior but 
the elaborate equipaent needed to attend to such messages and occasion-
ally to participate in their circ:u.lation. As against guilt and shame 
controls, though of course 1bese survive, one prime psychological lever 
of the other-directed person is a diffuse anxiety. This control equip-
2 
ment, instead of being like a gyroscope, is like a radar". 
It would seem then that since Brown University is one of the east's 
1110re expensive schools, and since SigDIII Nu is one of Brown 1s more ex-
pensive fraternities, our sample satisfies Riesman 1s criteria for an 
other-directed group, the lll9lllbers being young, in a large city, and 
frm upper-income families. In fact by these standards our group must 
be a very hot-bed of other-directedness. 
The data tells us that the greatest consensus as to what to do in 
certain situations occurs with respect to the ideal mode of behavior, 
and behavior in interaction with a fami~ member. Rieaman hypothesizes 
that the person's gyroscope is implanted early in life, either the parents 
1 Rieaman, D., 'lbe lonely crowd, New York: Doubleday, 1955, P 36 
2 Ibid, P 42 
(58) 
or their surrogates. Further, since these gyroscopic guides are learned 
by the child from his parents, and since the parents in turn learned 
them from their parents etc., the basi§ patterning of this guide would 
tend to change relative:cy little during the course of a few generations. 
Thus, though this is speculation, it is possible that one's perception 
of the ideal way to react in a given situation, because of its early in-
culcation, probab:cy remains fair:cy constant from generation to generation, 
and also probab:cy remains stable across a given culture. The gyroscope 
would be passed intact from father to son, and a person who relied on 
it to guide his behavior would be responding to situations much as his 
grandfather did thirty or forty years before. The constancy, then is 
perhaps both vertical as well as horizontal. It would seem, then, that 
inner-direction is a very effective technique for ensuring conformity. 
It will be remembered that our data also showed that the least 
consensus obtained when we asked our subjects what the average college 
man would do in a certain situation. That is, the members of our group 
could not agree as to what the generalized "other" might do. Whereas 
the consensus achieved on the ideal choice reflected a certain conformit.y 
of perception, a certain sharing of beliefs and attitudes, in short, a 
social norm, the average choice showed idiosyncratic perceptions or non-
shared attitudes. If this is general:!¥ true in our society, it would 
seem that the other-directed persons are continual:cy in a quandary as to 
how to respond, since they do not seem to have allY general noms. As 
Riesman said, guilt is the concallitant emotion to inner-direction and 
anxiet.y goes along with other-direction. This may be because anxiety, 
one of the results of conflict, is generated every time an other-directed 
(59) 
person wishes to act, biB action always having to resolve ccnflicting 
choices. !laving a great deal of social sensitivity leads the other-
directed person into a continual conflict as to which of the radar sig-
nals to act on, there being no other-directed behavioral norms on which 
to rel;y. 
Although the members of our group could not agree as to what the 
others would do in a given situation, they were certainl;y not oblivious 
to the others. Every member wore a striped tie and had a g~y flannel 
suit in his wardrobe. 1.his rather external conformi'IV'1 typified in our 
group by such details as clothes, is no real indication of "other-
directednessn 1 for Riesman feels that the other-directed person "aims 
to keep up with them (the others) not so much in external details as in 
the quality of his inner experience" •1 And he further says of the other-
directed, •his great sensitivity keeps him in touch with others on many 
2 
more levels than the externals of appearance and propriety." 
If this is true, then, the other-directed fraterni-cy man, while 
wearing the gray flannels, should also be aware of how others would 
react in certain situations, and the members of the fraternity should 
have some agreement on this. 
It will also be recalled that our group agreed more on how to 
respond to a hi status figure, next most when peers are concerned and 
least with respect to the l.o status figure. This seems to show that the 
amount of conformity diminishes in some way as we scale down the social 
ladder. The behavioral norms, them, are greater, or more readily learned 
1 Riesman, D., The lonely crowd, New York: Doubleday, 1955, P 40 
2 Ibid, P 40 
(60) 
when the interactions concern people who have an edge in statua. Our 
group must have been more pre-occupied by looking up the status heirarchy 
(61) 
and learning and agreeing upon the ways to respond, than in looking dOWilW'ard. 
Is this the way social norms are usuaJ.4r generated? Do groups first 
develop standards through a process of trying to stabilize behaviors which 
concern figures higher in status than aey of the group members themselves? 
Or is it simpq that norms regarding hi status outsiders arise more quickq 
than norms regarding interaction with peers? These questions must await 
further research. 
It must always be remembered that it can be misleading to say there 
is great consensus here and very little there, for these terms are onq 
relative. We know from our study that certain types of situat,ions elicit 
more consensus than others, but we cannot really tell when consensus becomes 
great. Does everyone in the group have to agree in order to have great 
consensus or do onq ten persons have to agree? This is also true of the 
use of the term, social nonn. 
How maey members of the group have to share the same beliefs and 
attitudes before a norm becomes a social norm? We have spoken sometimes 
as though there were a social nonn concerning ideal modes of responding 
and none concerning average modes of responding, or there was one concerning 
his status figures and none concerning lo status figures. Actualq, all we 
know is that the amounts of consensus very according to the types of situations 
involved, and that certain perceived standards of behavior are more shared 
than others. 
(62) 
CHAPTER X 
DISCUSSION PART II, INDIVIDUAL RESULTS 
As said earlier, the instructions to the subjects gave no hint or 
pressure to choose differential alternatives for the three choices self, 
average or ideal. We wished to ascertain whether subjects would spontaneous~ 
do this. We found they did, which leads us to believe that a person's 
!J.ctions'in aey situations are guided by at .least two sets of standards. 
The first standard is an experient:L.al one, based on a person's judgment 
of what he suspects the average person would dOJ the second is an evaluative 
standard based on a person's judgment of what he perceives as the best, 
ideal, or super-ego directed solution of the problem. The first, when 
followed, corresponds to other-direction, the second to inner-direction. 
By comparing these two responses, average and ideal, with the subject's self 
choice, it was possible to get an estimate of the subject's self perception 
regarding his conformity to each of these standards and also a measure of 
the amount of agreement between these two standards for him. 
Let us now look at the correlations which result when we c0111pare 
our first four scales with each other, the SA, SI, Ai, and ID scales; 
The SA and SI correlate with each other at .27 and both correlate 
about equal~ (.589 and .560) with the AI scale. :;imilar~, both the 
SA and SI scales correlate negatively" ( -.742 and -. 731) with the Id 
scale. These results are to be expected in view of these scales • non-
independence of construction. Also, we expect the relationship between 
the ID scale and the SA or SI to be negative, for if a perscn 's self 
choice agrees with either the average or the ideal he will necessarily 
have a low ID score, which is measured b,y the number of times his self 
score is different from both his ideal and average choices. 
The correlations which are interesting, however, are those which 
compare these first four scales with the scales which are independent 
construction-wise, or the P, ss, II, AA and the Sociometric scale. It 
will be recalled that the P scale measures the number of times that a 
person's designation of his average choice agrees with what most of the 
subjects selected for their self choice. This is our social-sensitivity 
score, or the score which indicates how well a person can predict how 
most of his fellow members would· re11pond in a given situation. The SA 
scale correlates with the P scale rather high:cy at .628, whereas the 
SI scale is independent of the P scale, the coefficient being .084. 
That is, the· person who is high on Self-Average conformity, or other-
direction, also tends to be high on predictive ability or social sensi-
tivity. The person who is low in Self-Average conformity is also low 
in Predictiveness. Predictiveness, however, is not related at all to 
Self.~Ideal conformity, or innar-direction. This is exactly what Riss-
man would predict, that the other-directed individual with his elaborate 
equipment for receiving cues from others is in a better position than 
the inner-directed individual for gauging what behaviors others would take. 
The relationship of these two scales, SA and SI, looks quite 
different when ccapared to the SS scale. The SS scale measures the amount 
of agreement between an individual's self choice and the group's mode for 
(63) 
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self choice. lbis then is our measure of an individual's real, or objective 
conformity, rather than his perceived conformity as measured by the SA. and 
SI scales. the SI scale correlates .295 with the SS scale, which is 
significant at .05, whereas the SA. scale is independent of the SS scale 
( .028). So despite the fact that the SA. scale relates to predictive 
ability, it shows no relationship to objective conformity. It is inner-
directedliess . which relates to this objective conformity. The more a 
person perceives himself as being guided by an internalized sense of the 
ideal, the more his own perceived actions conform to the group's own 
perceived actions. As stated before inner-direction may be more appropriate 
for ensuring conformity than other-direction. 
The SA. and SI scales both correlate positiveq with the II scale. 
the II scale portrays the agreement between each individual's ideal 
choice and the group's most popular ideal choice. That is, the II scale 
measures the amount each individual's ideal choice conforms to the group's 
statistical-ideal norm. The correlation shows that the higher a person's 
SA score, the more his ideal choice will conform to the group's idea of 
an ideal choice. This is also true of the SI scale, but the relationship 
is greater with SA. The other-directed person, then, despite the fact 
that he may not follow the ideal norm, knows what it is and can point it 
out as readiq, if not more readi:L,-1 than can the inner-directed. 
The Id scale, which measures the amount of a person's idiosyn-
cratic behavioral perceptions, correlates with onq two scales which 
are independent construction-wise. Tbe ID scale correlates significantq 
with both the P and the II scale, the correlation with P being -.345, 
and the correlation with II being -.407. Actual:cy 1 although these are 
the on:cy significant correlations, all the scales correlate negatively 
with the Id scale, which certain4' shows a trend. The correlation 
with the P scale of -.345 shows that the person who is high on the 
idios,rncratic scale is low in predictiveness, and also that the person 
who is low on the idios,yncratic scale is high in predictiveness. That 
is, the individual who is a perceptual non-conformer, is very poor in 
assessing how other members of his group would react to certain situa-
tions. He is also poor, as witness the negative correlation with the 
II scale, in assessing the group's norm for ideal behavior. The trend 
also indicates, though as said before, not significantly, that the 
perceptual non-conformer is also the objective non-conformer, the Id 
scale correlating negative:cy with the SS scale. 
We thus have a general impression of three types of individuals 
in our group, those high on the SA scale or other-directeds, those 
high on the SI scale or inner-directeds, and those high on the Id 
scale or perceptual non-conformers. Now, since the SA scale correl-
ates pesitive:cy with P, and since the SI scale is independent of P, 
and final4'"1 since the Id scale correlates negatively with P, we can 
assume that the idios,rncratic person is in the most error when trying 
to assess group opinion. The idio syncratic person not onzy perceives 
hilllselt as acting independent:cy 1 but this very independence is related 
to both his not knowing the norms and his inability to predict how 
others in his group will respond. It may be that his idios.yncraticism 
prevents him from properly assessing the group norms, or it may be that 
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his inabili~ to assess the group norms forces him into this perceptual 
idiosyncraticism. 
We have already mentioned the P scale's relationship to SA, SI, 
AI and Id, but P also correlates significantly with AA and n. This 
is not too surprising, for this shows a general tendency for an indivi-
dual who is in tune with the group in one sphere to be also in tune 
in other spheres. lhe subjects who are high in predieting what others 
spy they would do, also are high in having their average choice agree 
with the group's most popular average choice, and their ideal choice 
agree with the group's ideal. 
It is rather strange, however, that P shows such indepe!ldence with 
the sociometric scale. Other evidence would suggest that the socially 
sensitive person should also be the sociometrically popular person. 
The sociometrically popular person should be in a good position com-
munication-wise for receiving the messages from others needed in 
assessing group attitudes. Festinger's communication theories would 
seem to predict such a result, as he feels that the person with the 
most friends receives more communication than the perso~with fewer 
friends. In his study of the co11111unication of a spontaneous rumor, 
it was found that ease of communication tended to increase with persons 
l 
who had the most friends within the group. 
Our sociometric scale is independent of every one of our other 
scales, which is difficult to understand in the light of so much other 
evidence. Despite this, the reliability of the sociometric scale is 
1 Festinger, L., and Cartwright, D., A study of rumor; its origin and 
spread, Human Relations, 1948, l, 464-486 
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rather high, ruling out much error of measurement. 'fhe two correlations 
which most close~ approach significance with the sociometric scale 
are the correlations with the SS scale and the Grade-Point~verage. 
The correlation with the SS scale is minus .229, and the one with 
grade-point-average is plus .212. Thus, the o~ other variable that 
comes even close to positively correlating with sociometric status is 
the college grade. 
One of Jennings 1 first postulates is that the more nearly a member 
in his activity reiizes the norms and values of the group, the higher 
1 his sociometric rank. This means that the more one conforms to the 
norms of his group, the more sociometric votes he will get. The SS 
scale which measures the real confo:nnity in our group correlated -.229 
with the sociometric rank, and although this is not quite significant it 
shows an opposite tendency, a tendency for tholll high in conformity to 
receive fewer sociometric votes. 
Newcomb's Bennington stuey agreed with Jennings, also showing that 
hi sociometric vote receivers are the most confoming to Bennington's 
rather liberal norms. Our results show a tendency to disagree, adding 
support, instead, to the notion that the hi sociometric persons do not 
conform as muc~ perhaps their more secure position in the group allowing 
them to deviate from the norms of the group without the threat of membership 
loss. 
TWo studies agree with this notion. Hughes, in his study of an 
1 Jennings, Helen H., leadership and isolation, New York: Longmans, 
Green; 1943 
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industrial set-up, tells of girls who have been on the job longest 
being able to deviate from the production norm with more freedom than 
girls new on the job. "Apparent:cy- a girl who is socialzy well estab-
lished in the group can consistently break the rate a little with on:cy-
mild teasing as punishment. But outsiders who break the rate are severzy 
punished by ridicule and scorn; if they persist, they remain outsiders 
and if associations are important to them, they may be forced off the 
l 2 job". Also, Sherif's "A Preliminary Study of Inter-group Relations", 
a study of a boy's camp, lends support to the conclusion of Hughes. 
Norms revolving around hostility toward an out group were most rigidly 
adhered to by the least popular boys, whereas the popular boys deviated 
almost at will. 
Sociometric rank as a determinant of leadership was used by 
Newcomb and Chowdry in their stud;y, "The Relative Abilities of Leadere 
and Non-Leaders to Estimate Opinions of Their Own Groups•.3 Their major 
finding was that persons of high sociometric rank were better able to 
estimate group opinion on issues relevant to the functioning of the group 
than were people of low sociometric rank or isolates. Rather than estim-
ating group opinions on issues, our P scale measured the assessment of 
group norms concerning behaviors applicable in a given situation, and here 
sociometric rank did not relate to predictive efficiency. 
1 Hughes, E.C., The knitting of racial groups in industry, Amer. Soc. 
Rev., 1946, 11, P 517 
2 Sherif, M., A preliminary stud;y of inter-group relations, In J .H. Rohrer 
and M. Sherif (Eds.), Social Psychology at the Crossroads, New York: 
Harper, 1951, Pp 388-424 
3 Chowdry, K., and Newcomb, T.M., The relative abilities of leaders and 
non-leaders to estimate opinions of their own groups, Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, 1952, 47, Pp 51-57 
(68) 
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Newcomb and Chowdry also say that length of membership is not 
consistently related to an individual's ability to evaluate group 
opinion. We also checked this variable with respect to our P scale, 
and we came up with a similar result. Ability to score highl;y on the 
P scale does not relate to whether a person is a sophomore, junior or 
senior, despite the fact that seniors have been in the group longer 
and should have had more opportunity to have had the norms inculcated. 
The test used here was a single classification ana~sis of variance, 
and the results follow: 
TABLE 13 
ss DF v 
BE '!WEEN 47.~9 2 23.74 
WITHIN 810.L4 53 15.29 F 23.74 .1.55 
1$.29 
TOTAL 857.93 55 Not significant 
F 
.os (2) (53): 4.02 
'Ihus, the F is not significant, and we conclude that class difference 
in P scores are due to chance. 
Newcomb and Chowdr,y tell us also that academic stetus is not related 
to sociometric rank, and again we concur. The correlation between the 
sociometric scale and the grade point average in our group, although it 
was one of the sociometric scale's two highest correlations, did not 
quite reach significance. 
Looldng again at the SS scale, our measure of real confonnity, 
and its relationship to the SA scale, our measure of perceived confor-
mity to others, we see the correlation is -.028, or, that the scales are 
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l 2 3 
independent. Many studies, (Travers l94l.; Sappenfield, 1942; Wallen, 1943; 
4 
and Gorden, 1952) have indicated that a person perceived group opinion 
to be closer to his own than it actually is. In our terms, then, it would 
mean that people tend more to perceive themselves as agreeing with the 
average than, in fact, they actual~ do, or that the SA scores should be 
higher than the SS scores. 
Looldng at the means, we find the SA scale has a mean of 17 .92, and 
SS scale has a mean o! 18.33, or that the mean for real conformity is higher 
than for perceived conformity. This difference, however, is not significant. 
Alpha .05 
t 
- .39 
-
t 1.98 with llO d.f • 
• 05 
TABLE l4 
1 Travers, R.M.W., A stl)d;y in judging the opinions of groups, Aroh.Psychol., 
New York: 1941, 266 
2 Sappenfield, B.R., Athe attitudes and attitude estimates of Catholic, 
Protestant and Jewish students, Journal of Soc. Psychol., 1942, 16 
Pp 173-197 
3 Wallen, R., Individuals' estimates of group opinion, Journal of Soc. 
Psychol., 1943, 17, Pp 269-274 
4 Gorden, R.L., Interaction between attitude and definition of the 
situation in the expression of opinion, Amer. ~ociol. Rev., 1952, 17, 
Pp 50-58 
(71) 
We accept the Null l\n>Othesis and conclude that there is no difference 
between perception of agreement and real agreem&nt. 
Admitte~, our sociometric variabls has been dissappointing; the 
sociometric scale correlates significantly with no other scale, and, as 
we said in a previous section, not even class seems to make a difference. 
It is difficult, indeed to understand wcy class does not relate to sociometric 
ranking, as one would assume that the longer the person has been a member 
of a group, the higher is his sociometric status due to increased interaction. 
We thought, however, that perhaps increased interaction does make a 
difference, but that class ma,y not be the best indication of this. Perhaps 
the simple dichotoli\Y of whether or not a person lives in the fraternity 
house would be the best indica of amount of interaction. l'hat is, do members 
who live in the house receive more sociometric votes than those who commute? 
Here we finally find a sociometric relationship. A median test gave us 
a significant Chi Sq of 15.98, J~84 being significant for one degree of 
freedom at .OS, Thus, those who live in the bouse receive significantly 
more sociometric votes than do those who commute. 
Now does this increased interaction and sociometric popularit,y 
of the in-house members aid them in their predictive efficiency as to 
what others in the group would do? Are the in-house group members more 
conforming, more inner or other directed, more idiosyncratic? To answer 
these questions we computed five more median tests, one variable always 
being whether or not the subject lived in the fraternity house. 
The following table gives the results: 
TABLE l5 
Median Testa 
P SCALE CHI. SQ. .76 
SS SCALE CHI. SQ. .oo; 
Sl SCALE CHI. SQ. .04 
SI SCALE CHI. SQ. .49 
I SCALE CHI. SQ. .o4 
Since a Chi. Sq. of 3.84 is needed for significance at .o;, none 
of the preceeding results refute the Null Hypothesis, there being no 
differences that could not have resulted from chance. 
Thus, although living in the house is related to number of 
socianetric votes, it is not related to ~hing else; the two variables 
sociometric status and whether or not one lives in the house show complete 
independence with everything except each other. This, then, does not 
(72) 
argue for the theories which portray the socia~ sensitive, hi sociometric 
individual in the center of his group's communication net-work. 
CHAPTER XI 
SUMMMrl AND !oi.JCR RESULTS 
OUr problem was concerned with anal,yzing perceptual conformity at 
(7.3) 
two general levels, subjective and semi-objective. We bave defined sub-
jective conformity as the relationship existing between an individual•s 
perception of his own behavior aDd his perception o! norms or standards for 
that behavior. A.t the seai-objective level, conformity was defined as the 
relatipnship between an individ:ual•s perception o! behavior and an object• 
ive standard for that behavior in his -.bership group. FrOD1 th1.s we 
anaqzed eight different types o! conf'ol'lllity, four at each level. At the 
first level we described pure4 subjectiTe aspeots o! an individual• s 
perception of' his own conformity, whereas at the second level wa were 
able to assess the accuraa.y of the individual•s perception of the group 
norm aDd his conformity or lack of conformity to it. 1:hese eight types 
o! perceptual conformity were also related to other variables, such as 
type of situation, sociometric choice, elected leadership, academic 
success and length of group mlllllberahip. 
The sample chosen consisted of members of a college fraternity, all 
of whom had known each other for at least one year. The subjects were 
exposed to a static set of conditions, aDd we attempted to show both that 
their responses differed reliabl;r and were related to other variables. 
1:he measuring instrument, called the IISocial Situations Test~~, 
consisted of' forty situations in which members of a college fraternity 
could presUIIUlbq find themselves. The situations fell into four broad 
social areas, that is, ten situations involve interaction with a high 
status figure, ten with a lew status figure, ten with a peer and ten with 
a f'amiJT member. Each situation was followed by five behavioral altern• 
atives, and the subject was instructed to check, first, the one which most 
cl.Ciseq coincides with what he would dD, second:cy-, the one he thinks the 
average member of' the group would do, and, f'inall;r, the one which he feels 
ie the best or ideal way- in which to respond. 
The data was handled in two main wa;rs, anaqsis of' the group and 
anaqsie of' the individual. In anaqsing the group data we assessed the 
amount of' consensus for each item in the four areas. When the areas 
are then c0111pared in terms of' the consenns, we found significant 
dif'f'erences. 'lhe most consensus ns obtained on items f'r0111 the fami:cy-
area, next most for high statns items, next for peer items and least 
for low status items. We also c0111pared the group responses in terms 
of the choice-scale, and again we obtained significant dif'f'erences. 
'lhe most consensus was with the ideal choice, that is, there was the most 
agreaent when they- were askltd to indicate the ideal way- in which to respond. 
'lhe next most consensus was on self' choice, and the least occurred when 
they- had to choose what the aTerSge person would do. 
!he data on individuals was handled qy constrncting eight scales, 
each measuring a different aapect e£ conformity-, and each was checked 
for reliabilit;re 'lhe four scales measuring subjective conformity-
distinguished three general ty-pes of' individuals, those whose perceived 
actions conf'ol'1118 with their perceptions of' the ideal, or what Riesman 
might call an inner-directed individual, those whose perceived actions 
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confom with their perception of the thing the a'ftrage college un 
would do, or what RieSII&n might call •other-d:irectecP, and, final.:cy-1 
those whose perceptions or own behavior conrom to neither their perception 
or the ideal nor the average, or what we have called the idiosyncratic 
:l.ndividual. 
1he major findings !rca these individual data versa 
1. No diftereMes were to11Dd between the Mounts of inner and other 
direction; no differences either when the group is broken dOIIIU 
into sopbcaore, j'llllior and senior cluses. 
2. b other-directed indi'ri.dual. was found to be 1110re accurate in 
assessi.Dg group nol'lllll than was the inner-d:irected. 'lhe 
idiosyncratic individual, hallever, 'II&S in the 1110st error. 
3. 'lhe inner-directed indiyidual was found to be more of an 
objective or real canforaer to group noms than was the 
other-directed. 'lhe idio81llcratic individual was less of 
an objective conformer than a'ftn the other-d:irectecl, but. 
thiB difference was not significant. 
4. S.aicaetr:l.c ranld.ng related to whether or not an :l.ndividual 
lived in the fraternity house, but did not relate to aeything 
else. 'lh&t is, although high sociometries were more apt to 
live in the fraternity house, thq were no different with respect 
to inner direction, other direction, accuracy of group nom 
prediction, class, and even tended to show less real or 
Objective confarmit7• 
(7$) 
S. •lthough accuracy in prediction does differentiate other-
directed, inner-directed and idiosyncratic individuals. this 
acaurac;y is not related to length of group meDibership, or, 
as stated above, to sociometric rank. 
6. No differences were f'ound between amounts of' perceived conf'• 
ol'lllity and amounts of' real conf'ormit;r. 
1. No relationship was. f'ound between sociometric rank and elected 
J.aadership, nor were the elected leaders found to differ in 
accuracy of prediction or in real conformi t;y. 'lbere was a. 
significant difference between leaders and non-leaders, 
howevor, which shows the elected leaders to be acre inner-
dirsctede 
(76) 
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